A new book by Hans Lindahl by Zanetti, G.
403  Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, XXI, 2019, 3, pp. 403-415 
 ISSN: 1825-5167 
A NEW BOOK BY HANS LINDAHL 
GIANFRANCESCO ZANETTI 
Department of Jurisprudence, University of Modena and Reggio Emilia 
fzanetti@mac.com 
ABSTRACT 
Hans Lindahl’s new book is an extremely valuable contribution. It offers a fresh notion of globaliza-
tion processes, grounded in a sound social ontology. Lindahl’s theory is described on the background 
of most of the contemporary debate, painstakingly scrutinized in the book. The sobering conclusion 
is that no Great Emancipation is truly possible: the only contingency-burden solutions are those nor-
mative practices that Lindahl calls “restrained collective self-assertion”.  
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The Argentinian writer Jorge Louis Borges stretched his wild imagination beyond 
the usual boundaries that even phantasy writers set to themselves. Among the labyrin-
thine, mind-bending ideas his fertile mind was able to conceive, there is of course the 
notorious Book of Sand, an enchanted volume whose pages, each of them, can always 
split into two different pages, in a seamless process, and whose not-reachable, unthink-
able central page has no back1. One does not have to delve into the optical paradoxes 
by Escher or by Victor Vasarely to enjoy the thrill of an intellectual challenge of this 
kind. It is possible to experience a sort of healthy, theoretical bewilderment even in the 
mundane, analytical field of contemporary legal and political philosophy.  
1 El libro de Arena, Buenos Aires, Emecé, 1975; Norman Thomas Di Giovanni translated it into 
English for The New Yorker.  
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The new book by Hans Lindahl2 is in fact, among other things, a daring exploration 
of a puzzling, intriguing subject – can there be an inclusion that does not exclude, a 
political space that has only an inside, but no outside? That sounds like a highly ab-
stract, rarefied subject. This seems to be, nevertheless, “the most fundamental issue 
raised by the notion of global law, namely, whether a legal order is possible or even 
actual that has an inside but no outside, hence that could realize a unity that includes 
without excluding” (p. 87). This is, again, “the central conceptual and normative ques-
tion about the globality of global law: is an emergent global order possible or even actual 
that has an inside but no outside?” (p. 140). This is “the single question that drives this 
entire book: can legal (alter)globalisations mean anything other than the globalization 
of inclusion and exclusion?” (p. 177). 
Spoiler alert, it cannot. Some of us would like such an ozonic notion to be reasona-
ble, and such a program to be feasible, but Lindahl’s scrutiny of the subject, although 
compassionate and respectful, cuts quite deep – and what gets cut and sliced in the 
process, is a large part of the contemporary discussion on global legal orders. The book 
is more than four hundred pages long, but despite the repetitions, which I actually 
found useful, it makes for quite a compelling reading.  
There are several reasons for this, and one is Lindahl’s style. The author effortlessly 
surveys the debate on globalization issues, but has also a solid philosophical back-
ground; the style, neither intimidating nor fastidiously sparkling, is therefore often quite 
technical, but occasionally colloquial expressions pop up in a sudden rhetorical change 
that grabs the reader’s attention, usually when an important point is at stake.  
Beside the official structure of the book, described in the Introduction, there is, I 
submit, an underpinning, but transparent, incremental strategy in Lindahl’s book.  
For example, early in the book the reader is told the tale of a Gandhian movement, 
active in India, the so called Karnataka State Farmers’ Association, KRRS (Karnataka 
Rajya Raitha Sangha; I am not sure that the acronym is explained in the book – 
“sangha” is an interesting notion for those who study encompassing groups). 
KRRS took action in order to occupy and destroy fields of Genetically Modified 
Organisms, owned by Monsanto (readers may find interesting to know that Monsanto, 
after the green light by US antitrust authority, was acquired by Bayer in 2018; the brand 
will therefore soon disappear), as a way to assert and revalorize Indian peasant ways of 
life, against measures of trade liberalization under the aegis of the WTO. The tale is 
told at page 24. From that moment on, the resilient members of the KRRS, their point 
of view, the implications of their actions, and so on, keep cropping up in the pages of 
 
2 Hans Lindahhl, Authority and the Globalisation of Inclusion and Exclusion, Cambridge, UK, Cam-
bridge University Press, 2018.  
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Authority and the Globalisation of Inclusion and Exclusion on a regular basis. I 
counted sixty different pages where KRRS troubles are mentioned, bibliography not 
included; their last apparition is on page 391. Virtually each chapter teaches something 
about that tale. The meaning of KRRS’S deliberate, collective action gains weight and 
scope, and some of the most powerful positions in the contemporary legal-philosoph-
ical debate are conjured up in order to shed light, from different but related points of 
view, on it. Lindahl goes deeper and deeper, unveiling several layers of complexity. 
Needless to say, the action taken by KRRS members against Monsanto property is just 
an example, although an eloquent and emblematic one: nevertheless, it becomes pos-
sible step by step to grasp what is truly at stake in this apparently oh so mundane chapter 
of a local political struggle.  
Another example of such an incremental expositive strategy is a more theoretical 
one. In order to make his point, Lindahl needs to offer an original model of law – 
something that could be per se the subject of another book and of another review. Such 
a concept of law is dubbed Institutionalized and Authoritatively mediated Collective 
Action, IACA (it is first mentioned on p. 46). While attempts to capture law as some 
kind of collective action are not necessarily a brand-new strategy (Finnis’s “law as coor-
dination” may be deemed as bearing some vague resemblance to IACA3), Lindahl’s 
proposal is, all in all, an original one.  
The main tenets of this model are illustrated by a simple, down to earth example: a 
bunch of students cooking a common meal together in the college dormitory (such a 
“manifold of students” is first mentioned on page 48, but the cooking activity in a 
kitchen enters the stage on page 20). The happy fellows will come back time and again 
(a total of twenty times, the last one on page 305), conjured up to explain different 
details of Lindahl’s legal-philosophical proposal, and at the same time their cooking 
enterprise is exposed in its rich, sometimes fascinating, complexity. While it is perfectly 
legitimate to be glad to be past those nerdy cooking nights, it must be acknowledged 
that this consistent harping on that culinary activity does smooth the understanding of 
a rather complex train of thoughts.  
On one occasion (p. 287), Lindahl is so aware that the philosophical nuances of his 
text can test the reader’s motivational factors that he actually warns about it, and suggests 
which paragraphs can be skipped if one is not sincerely interested into the highly theo-
retical details of the issue at stake.  
Another formal feature of the book is the structure of each chapter. The Introduc-
tion provides a road map, and each chapter starts with a synopsis of the problem, and 
with the description of the next steps, the inner formal structure of the chapter itself. 
 
3 John Mitchell Finnis, “Law as Co-ordination”, Ratio Juris, 1989, 2 (1): 97-104.  
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There is a point of view, however, from which every single chapter is simply about 
Lindahl sparring and fencing with some of the main characters of the contemporary 
debate, basically testing his own philosophical position against those hold by other 
thinkers. These other positions are sometimes refuted (although acknowledged in their 
important role: e.g., Negri and Hardt on the notion of multitude and its implications), 
and sometimes absorbed as at least syntonic with the one he is advocating for (e.g., 
Saskia Sassen’s sociology of globalization). 
Even those authors with whom Lindahl vigorously disagree are refuted with respect 
and good philosophical manners: on a single occasion one can get the feeling of a mild 
yet simmering impatience, when he slips in that dreaded formula “whatever this might 
mean”, which usually implies that in the writer’s humble opinion there is no serious 
meaning involved under the circumstances (it’s about Castells’ “space of flows”, p. 83).  
It must be said from the outset that, just because of the above mentioned reasons, 
this is a very good book: it is a sound, structured text, with a clear position, extremely 
well documented, readable and sometimes compelling, supported by a first rate philo-
sophical background, and indeed useful.  
One of the reasons Authority and the Globalisation of Inclusion and Exclusion is 
specifically useful is, of course, that it provides an original vision of globalization prob-
lems, but on the other side it also lets the reader see, as it were, the forest through the 
trees, it offers an help to better survey an often complex debate – always within the 
frame of an original reading of such issues.  
It is nonetheless possible, of course, to offer some criticism: a good book is never 
wholeheartedly beyond reproach. Some books are like Monteverdi’s madrigali: you 
may like them, and if you like them you like them a lot, because they are exquisite 
tokens of a difficult genre, or you may dislike them, because madrigals are an acquired 
taste, and perplexity is an acceptable reaction to the Selva Morale e Spirituale. If the 
reader is looking for some ready-made, brilliant and ground-breaking solution, he may 
find Authority and the Globalization occasionally dazzling, rather than intriguing. The 
flavor of the book is that of an embraced, and harnessed, complexity. 
A good example is the notion of territory and space. That territory is a notion that 
does not belong exclusively to geography is something known at least since Hannah 
Arendt famously challenged (in some passing remarks) the traditional view in Eich-
mann in Jerusalem4.  
In recent years, spatial concepts have been exposed in all their normative potential, 
a potential that can involve dangers and risks. The notion of cyberspace, emphasis on 
 
4 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, New York, NY, The 
Viking Press, 1963.  
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space, led some courts of justices to conceptualize the first hackings into private web-
sites as trespass: a legal notion that for many reasons was not appropriate. Websites are 
no fenced estates, they are no spaces with clear borders that can be drawn in a map. 
Yet, as Mark Lemley, of Stanford, summarized back in 2003, if we buy into the meta-
phor of cyberspace, we may expect very concrete, very real legal effects and conse-
quences5.  
Lindahl is, on this point, extremely effective. He starts from the distinction between 
a position and a place, that can be tracked all the way back to the first Heidegger of 
Sein und Zeit. A geometrical space is a thing of positions, each of them identified by a 
set of coordinates. An everyday space is a thing of places, and often one is not truly 
aware of the “region of a place” until he fails to find something in its place. From this 
starting point, Lindahl is able to show why de-territorialisation does not and cannot 
mean delocalisation, in other words why globalization must be a specific way to localize 
action. “Succinctly, if (global) law is defined as a specific sort of social order, then 
(global) law must be a spatial […] order that differentiates and interconnects places into 
a unity of sorts: a network of places” (p. 21).  
Now, on the one hand, this is a refreshing insight. Lindahl is aware of the novelty of 
his approach: “most, perhaps all, contemporary discussions of globalization processes 
share a common assumption” (p. 10), “[s]ociologists of globalization often argue that 
law is becoming increasingly de-territorialised” (p. 21). Lindahl’s program is to debunk 
this narrative, together with the lofty claim that a global order that includes without 
excluding can exist. Even a global order requires a spatial closure, and if there is a 
closure there is, somewhere, somehow, an outside – an exclusion.  
Borders are spatial boundaries that join and separate what is deemed as domestic 
and what is labeled as foreign. Borders, although a controversial notion (Italy is a coun-
try that came to existence as such by conjuring up the narrative of the oxymoronic 
“natural borders”, the Alps and the Sea, shaped as a Boot), are something easy to grasp. 
They follow our primary intuitions, supported by centuries of cartography (ancient 
Greeks, on the other hand, would have probably used Greek Language as the main 
factor to define Hellas).  
Borders are reassuring, not just in a quasi-irenic scenario where good fences make 
good neighbors, as Robert Frost most famously put it, but even on a dystopian back-
ground. In Elysium6, an elitist Jodie Foster prevents humans living on earth to join the 
aristocracy of those lucky few men and women who live in a separate artificial environ-
ment, orbiting Earth, whose expensive health technology grants them an extraordinarily 
 
5 Mark Lemley, “Place and Cyberspace”, California Law Review, 2003, 91: 521-558. 
6 Elysium, by Neill Blomkamo, 2013, with Matt Damon and Jodie Foster. 
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long life. Needless to say, Elysium already exists, but in a less reassuring way: it is not 
far from us in outer space, it is among us, because life expectancy has dramatically 
grown, although the last ten years of a quality life are way more expensive, from a Med-
icare point of view, than all the years needed to reach that point. The growth of life 
expectancy is probably one of the driving forces that motivates global discrimination.  
Limits, on the other hand, are far from being reassuring. They are truly another 
kettle of fish: they are spatial boundaries that join and separate “the own” and “the 
strange”. Their philosophical ancestry dwells in the phenomenology of Husserl. A 
global legal order can have no borders, but cannot exist without limits, without some 
kind of inclusion and exclusion (they can be “borderless but not limitless”, p. 43), alt-
hough of a rather different and abstract kind. Global legal orders imply a “limited” (in 
this technical meaning) spatial unity, in the mere sense of a given interconnection of 
“places” that necessarily excludes many other (theoretically available) ways of organiz-
ing those places.  
This implies a globalization of inclusion and exclusion. “The IACA model of law 
substantiates the conjecture that whereas (state) borders and their attendant distinction 
between domestic and foreign places are a contingent feature of legal orders, limits, 
hence the distinction between own and strange places, is a structural feature of a range 
of legal orders that claim or might come to claim global validity. Indeed, nothing in the 
concept of IACA requires that this spatial unity be bordered in the form of state terri-
toriality” (p. 64, italics added). 
This is tantamount to stating that legal orders, both global and otherwise, must have 
spatial boundaries, although globalization processes seem to be specifically responsible 
for legal topographies that are “significantly different from the bordered territoriality of 
states” (p. 145). For example, lex constructionis, a sectorial form of the new merchant 
law, is revealed to be endowed with a spatial unity that is pragmatic, rather than geo-
graphic – and the reason is that it is grounded on an interconnection of places that are 
physically removed from each other (pp. 144-45). Lindahl’s concept of place (this was 
Castells’ mistake, p. 148), as far as globalization processes are concerned, does not 
therefore imply physical proximity. 
So far so good; and it is sound, valuable and rich philosophy. The poison may be 
found in the very same brilliant strategy that made such achievements possible in the 
first place.  
Once the meaning of all the key words has been (wisely) changed, of course the 
theoretical outcome will be different. Global orders can be conceptualized as all inclu-
sive, when the “globe” one has in mind is the spherical surface of planet Earth, because 
that turns space into a surface – national states are bounded extension, global legal 
orders can therefore be unbounded extension. But a world is not a thing, not even a 
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planet or a universe, a world is a kosmion of meanings enlightened from within (as Eric 
Voegelin would have put it7), a nexus of meaningful relations (Lindahl’s favorite for-
mula), a necessary background for all things and events that dwell in such a world. It 
makes possible an horizon of inter-subjective experience, that exposes itself as limited 
when challenged by and from another point of view, by and from a strange place, by 
and from a different world: “different worlds – partially different worlds – intersect […]; 
legal globalisations attest to the entwinement of worlds, where entwinement means both 
interference and interconnection” (p. 36). 
This is possible because behind a world, behind each world, there is a group of 
some kind and its narrativity – individuals can perceive and conceptualize themselves 
as a group mostly because such narrativity is able to embed that group in a “wider 
plexus of social relations and meanings – a world” (p. 69).  
This certainly is, in my opinion, a much more interesting way to look at the problems 
of global legal orders. But I am not sure it is, strictly speaking, a debunking: if words 
are given a (very) different meaning, then the outcome will be different. Inclusion/ex-
clusion is a now an inescapable feature of legal orders, included global legal orders, but 
that is because the new meaning of the words is so different, so thin and at the same 
time wide, broad, so far away from the usual and intuitive sense we usually attach to 
them (even in the scientific discussion among academia dwellers), that Lindahl’s thesis 
is validated.  
Lindahl’s “space” is so abstract as to be inescapable. Obviously any personal author-
ity and jurisdiction has to be territorial – “in the wide sense” Lindahl has “defended in 
this book” (p. 153, italics added). At this point even cyber law is but a variation on the 
“phenomenologically inspired IACA model of law” (p. 153). eBay, for example, has 
no access that is not also a spatial access, although “a spatial access in the sense of joint 
action that interconnects places by bringing near what is far: goods and payment” (p. 
155) – and this is, literally, eBay’s own legal topography. 
Once his premises are accepted, and words are correctly translated into Lindahl’s 
phenomenological English, the outcome is almost certain. My opinion is that it is worth 
the effort: that Lindahl’s philosophy of global orders is subtler, more interesting, more 
instructive, and much more appealing than most of the contributions one reads on this 
subject. It is, however, also a reasoned departure from the usual way to organize the 
Western conceptual lexicon on the subject. The pleasant risk, in these cases, is to make 
such strong assumptions that the result seems to be already implied, built in them.  
Armed with this “phenomenologically inspired IACA model of law” Lindahl is able 
to come to grips with several scholars of different orientations, fleshing out at the same 
 
7 Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1952.  
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time his very same IACA model, and providing precious insights on several hot issues 
in the field of legal and political philosophy.  
The book is so rich that even an overview is simply impossible, but it is probably 
fair to mention a few random sub-subjects, just to give a hint of the food for thought to 
be found in Authority and the Globalisation of Inclusion and Exclusion.  
Once Lindahl’s lexicon and its implied theoretical consequences are accepted, it 
must be acknowledged that between state law and emergent legal orders there are both 
similarities and key differences. Emergent legal orders do not certainly enjoy the “bor-
dered territoriality of states”. But they certainly share with traditional and bordered 
states Lindahl’s “broader sense” (p. 158, italics added) of a truly “transhistorical” (Sas-
sen) territoriality that is implied, as hinted above, by lex constructionis or by eBay.  
Even this kind of spatial territoriality, however, implies a constitutive exposure to 
forms of contestations in which spatial boundaries (again, it is not about geographic 
borders here) are conceptualized as the limits of collective action. This perception is 
the direct outcome of experiencing the un-removable outside, an outside that can be 
boiled down to a fan of practical options, marginalized options, possibilities bracketed 
away as “strange” and not validated as our “own”. This exposure, this vulnerability, is a 
crucial aspect of legal orders. It is “here” that the rather abstract and theoretical notion 
of an inescapable “outside” morphs into a politically relevant issue.  
Lindahl deftly conjures up the famous DDoS attack of PayPal’s website by Opera-
tion Payback. Such an attack can be conceptualized in two ways, namely both as a 
healthy normative challenge, in order to change the own/strange configuration, and as 
a simply, merely malicious or even criminal act. This has to do with the “lexical war-
fare” described by Peter Ludlow: is ‘hacktivism’ related to social change, or to sinister, 
immoral, criminal activities? Lindahl nails it: “For there is no independent position, no 
bird’s-eye view, that allows for establishing whether an act is simply (il)legal or whether 
it also raises a normative challenge that authorities should heed […]” (p. 159).  
This is a remarkable features of legal orders. It is visible, for example, in the civil 
disobedience phenomena. Legal systems cannot absorb or include civil disobedience, 
as a special norm whose ratio would be, say, that of catalyzing a (from a given point of 
view) “necessary” legal reform, a normative change. There are specific procedures to 
determine legal change, but by definition civil disobedience cannot be one of them.  
Legal systems, however, have no way to prevent civil disobedience phenomena: phe-
nomena that aim precisely at such a change. Any act of deliberate disobedience can 
always be conceptualized as the outcome of a selfish attitude, as a reluctance to bow 
before the majesty of those rules that are obeyed for the sake of collective freedom, as 
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Cicero would put it8. The point of view of those who practice civil disobedience is 
obviously different, and such as that it is always possible to take that position and claim 
for such acts a different and so loftier ratio. There is no independent position, no bird’s-
eye view, that allows for establishing whether an act of civil disobedience is a normative 
challenge carried out in order to make the legal-political system fairer and therefore 
stronger, more bent to the values of, say autonomy and equality, or that act is simply 
mere illegal disobedience, whose outcome is a weaker and less fair legal-political system 
– whether authorities should at least listen to it, or rather harshly repress it.  
The IACA model of law is no natural law system; it offers no moral absolutes; it 
embraces complexity at the expense of any kind of normative Gemütlichkeit.  
There is no world, there are only worlds. And this has far reaching consequences 
for counter-globalization movements, well-intentioned as they may be: there can be 
only emancipations in the plural “rather than an emancipatory process in the singular”; 
legal orders cannot be transparent crystals, pure normative pyramids, because ambigu-
ity is inherent to them from the very beginning, when they emerge by including and 
excluding at the same time (p. 199).  
This is true even when Lindahl turns his attention to a very special domain of law, 
that seems specifically apt for justifying “the idea of forms of legal globalization which 
are strongly global by dint of having an inside but no outside: human rights” (p. 207). 
Again, this could be the subject of another book and another review – although the gist 
is simply that human rights are simply no exception to Lindahl’s (general) rule.  
On the most basic level, even establishing what should be deemed as a massive hu-
man rights abuse implies a local set of shared value. Is an extermination of unborn 
babies by abortion such an abuse? This is not Lindahl’s example – but I get very dif-
ferent results if one theorizes the notion of massive abuse of human rights aiming at 
human beings independently from sex, religion, “race”, and sexual orientation, or if 
the same notion is theorized aiming at human beings independently from sex, religion, 
“race”, and stage of development (so that embryos are included). The former list leads 
to Senator Clinton’s famous statement: gay rights are human rights9. Most conservative, 
white evangelical, MAGA hats Americans, can safely embrace the latter. It is a pity that 
Lindahl does not directly address the issue of equality in any specific chapter (there are, 
however, important hints passim, for example on p. 248 ss).  
This is, therefore, my first remark. Global orders that allegedly create an inside with-
out an outside, an inclusion without exclusion, are linked to a narrative of borders and 
 
8 Pro Aulo Cluentio Habito, 146: legum servi sumus, ut liberi esse possimus.  
9 In a well known speech on December 6, 2011 at the UN in Geneva.  
 
412  GIANFRANCESCO ZANETTI 
 
surfaces – a narrative that played an important role in Western history, but whose ex-
plicative power is all but spent. Lindahl’s book provides the conceptual tools that can 
help us to conceptualize global orders in a subtler way. According to this different, and 
more appealing, narrative, however, an exclusion of those who dwell outside is impos-
sible to avoid. Try as we may we end up excluding. There can’t be a (the) Great Eman-
cipation, the Last Emancipation. We can only have partial, situated, context-depend-
ing, contingency-burden emancipations (what I call Lindahl’s sobering thought). One 
would expect a direct scrutiny of the notion of equality, but there is no chapter, in 
Lindahl’s book, directly devoted to such a notion. We cannot, most likely, realize any 
Equality with capital E. We can detect a specific inequality, and then fight in order to 
make sure it is removed, so that the given “difference” which was the ground for dis-
crimination has no longer any legal impact. Vico’s famuli, the serfs of the “heroic” age, 
fight for universal equality, and universal citizenship. Such an universal inclusion does 
not include women, of course – yet what they must claim, what they have to claim, is 
universal equality. Women are not foreign, they are “somewhere else”. Those heroic 
plebeians cannot demand “equality for each and all except women”, they just do not 
consider women an issue to begin with. This could be the logic of equality: it is always 
about the removal of a given inequality, and yet it must claim to be about universal 
equality, for each and all.  
Contingency cannot therefore be expunged, it is a radically built-in feature of (global) 
legal orders; “it is an ineradicable feature of legal orders”10. Now, while it is true that it 
is a “contingency that those very same orders conceal when claiming universality for 
themselves” (p. 225) one wonders if this is not a performative condition of an emergent 
legal order. It has been pointed out that a scientist perfectly knows that his theory will 
be, sooner or later, falsified, but “has to” claim that his theory is correct. Alexy’s well-
known thesis is that a legal system cannot claim to be unjust, even if every such system 
is more or less unjust. Contingent emancipations (in the plural) “must” perhaps claim 
to be the universal emancipation they cannot be. This could be the latest incarnation 
of Makinson’ s Preface Paradox11; this would shed light on a haunting line by Lindahl: 
“Certainly, representation must claim to be able to articulate who and what we really 
are about; yet this articulation is premature and contestable […]”12. It is perhaps, at 
bottom, a Nietzschean theme: representation is always misrepresentation because con-
tingency makes the represented at least partially inaccessible to an impossible “authen-
tic” representation. 
 
10 Hans Lindahl, “Inside and Outside Global Law (Julius Stone Address)”, Sydney Law Review, 41, 1, 
2019: 23. 
11 David Clement Makinson, “The Paradox of the Preface”, Analysis, 1965, 25: 205-7.  
12 Lindahl, “Inside and Outside Global Law”, cit.: 12 (italics added). 
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This is, by the way, consistent with the “irreducibility of political plurality to the unity 
of global legal order” (p. 227), because a self-identity grounded on a (false) notion of 
universal emancipation, on such a daring claim, makes that (each) position specifically 
difficult to absorb or dilute, or blend in another equally self-styled universal identity. 
Claiming a universality without an outside dramatically ends up reinforcing a pluralism 
of contingent emancipation identities.  
This train of thought is consistent with a social ontology that prevents any absolute 
legitimacy of any representation. Representation acts (the best part is of course the 
grana fina of Lindahl’s analysis, that makes use of the distinction between representa-
tion of and representation as by Nelson Goodman), that are necessary to collectives, 
always take for granted something, and for this reason they are, again, always, “contest-
able” (p. 233). They are, as it were, essentially contestable identities.  
The problem is that identities do not exist in a vacuum, and there can be no self-
identification without an other-identification – a collective is included and the rest is 
excluded – this is about boundaries, not necessarily about borders. This is, in a nutshell, 
Lindahl’s social ontology: a group closure into an inside (self-identification) confronts 
it with an outside (the “rest”: other-identification) that, as long as it is conceptualized as 
unordeable, challenges the power and the order that dwell “inside” (and such an out-
side does exist within the collective, too, shaped as a resistance force against what is 
determined as the “point” of that given collective action, see p. 301).  
This is my second remark. “Questionability is a constitutive element of the mode of 
beings of collectives” (Inside and Outside ….). So far so good. The practical outcome 
of such a position seems to be that legal orders are inherently exposed to legitimate 
contestation – a contestation radiating from that outside that gets marginalized by the 
order, and bracketed away by the necessarily false narrative of universal equality. 
Granted: groups, “collectives”, cannot be deemed as endowed with absolute legitimacy 
because they always take “something” for granted – Vico’s famuli would not consider 
half the population. This exposure, this vulnerability, nevertheless, is probably a con-
dition of their value (a la Nussbaum) for human beings; it is not a regrettable feature of 
our human condition. An unquestionable collective, an unquestionable legal order, 
would strike us as inhuman and nightmarish13.  
This is a major contribution to social ontology, and a most needed one, after 
Searle14 (it somehow resonates with the notion of nested encompassing groups, versus 
 
13 Martha Craven Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, Cambridge UK, Cambridge University Press, 
1986. 
14 John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, New York, NY, The Free Press,1995. 
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“larger society”, by Raz15: built-in pluralism, incompatible options, a social barometer 
stuck on unsettled weather).  
There is no way out. Even “ignoring” the rest (outside), or some of it, is indeed a 
response. 0 Celsus temperature is a temperature just like the others, actually an im-
portant one. Ignoring can be an effective response, and it is for this reason that political 
struggle takes the shape of a demand for recognition.  
The pages on recognition are perhaps among the most compelling in Lindahl’s 
book. His articulate, philosophical analysis percolates ultimately into (one could even 
write: boils down to) a dry, sober vision of politics: “political plurality is […] irreducible 
to the unity of one legal order – not even in the indeterminately long run” (p. 286). 
Recognition problems are so complex that the only reasonable way to deal with them, 
far from any universal solution, is what Lindahl calls a restrained collective self-asser-
tion, i.e., the constant searching for situational, context-oriented generalizations (in the 
plural) rather than the dreaming the impossible dream of (singular) universalization – 
and that can sometimes be achieved by suspending the full application of the law in 
order to protect those who struggle for recognition, the “other  (in ourselves) as other 
than us” (p. 287). 
Recognizing the other in ourselves as other than us is like dancing on eggshells. 
“There is an irreducible tension in reciprocity that it is either concealed or underesti-
mated by theories of reciprocal recognition: recognition of the other as one of us is 
recognition of the other as one of us” (p. 319). 
There is no way out from a theoretical point of view. But there is perhaps a way in-
between in and out from a practical point of view, or at least this seems to be Lindahl’s 
position  
There are at least three different modes of “collective self restraint”, which are, at 
the end of the day, the concrete politics endorsed by Lindahl’s philosophy: and again, 
it is impossible now to discuss them. I would have, however, expected Lindahl --and 
this is my third and last remark-- to discuss bio-cultural rights: can such rights be 
deemed as a form of self-restrained action? The current environment crisis makes the 
discussion (not the acceptance) of any normative device that may help to contrast it an 
issue of critical relevance.  
One could ask, at the end of the day, if this is not a case of great mountains giving 
birth to a little mouse (parturiunt muntes egreditur ridiculus mus). After all this strutting 
and fretting on the legal-philosophical stage, is all what we are left with a sober collection 
of seemingly unsystematic political devices, a bunch of exercises in moderation, a few 
 
15 Avishai Margalit, Joseph Raz, National Self-Determination, in Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Do-
main, Oxford, UK, Clarendon, 1994, pp. 125-145.  
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techniques of political wisdom, “strategies that defer acts of setting the boundaries of 
(il)legality)”?  
Yes, but this is no mean feat. There can be only “provisional responses” (Inside and 
Outside …, cit.), true, but provisional responses are first and foremost responses. These 
provisional responses are grounded on a sound philosophy, one that validates political 
virtues - listening skills, one that enables the listeners to acknowledge and respect the 
“scream” of counter-globalization movements, and maintain a compassionate attitude 
toward the marginalized ones – self-restraint turns out to be a key virtue for political 
entities.  
 
 
 
